As Syrian rebel forces swept from Aleppo to Hama in a matter of days in December 2024, Kianistan Podcast turned to Professor Berk Esen, a renowned Istanbul-based expert on the geopolitics of the Middle East and Turkish domestic politics, for context on both the unfolding Syrian collapse and the internal Turkish dynamics shaping Ankara’s response. Host Tafhim Kiani opens by acknowledging the timing could not be more urgent, with the region shifting by the hour as the conversation takes place.

Before turning to Syria, Esen offers a detailed picture of Turkey’s own political landscape: President Erdogan’s coalition of nationalist and religious right-wing parties, a fractured but increasingly competitive opposition, and what Esen describes using the political science term ‘competitive authoritarianism’, a system he compares directly to Hungary and Poland, where elections occur but are neither fully free nor fair.

Esen then walks through the rapid collapse of Syrian government forces, tracing the roots of the current offensive back to the 2011 civil war and explaining why, in his assessment, Israel’s shifting calculations following the Gaza war and the Hezbollah conflict created the strategic opening HTS needed to cut Iran’s supply lines through Syria.

The conversation closes with a sober assessment of what a fragmented, contested Syria could mean for Turkey, Russia, Iran and Israel alike, and a shared sense between host and guest that, whatever the immediate jubilation among rebel forces, the region has entered a period of profound and dangerous uncertainty.

Key Topics Discussed

Turkey’s Slide Toward Competitive Authoritarianism

Esen lays out the internal political dynamics defining Erdogan’s Turkey heading into this critical moment.

• Esen describes Turkey as governed since 2002 by Erdogan’s coalition of nationalist and religious right-wing parties, some elements of which he characterises as far-right.
• He applies the political science term ‘competitive authoritarianism’ or ‘hybrid authoritarianism’ to Turkey’s system, directly comparing it to Hungary and Poland rather than to outright Russian-style autocracy.
• Esen notes Turkey holds elections that are technically free but not fair, citing the ruling coalition’s control of state television, vast financial resources and reported use of thousands of paid social media accounts.
• He highlights a striking shift: the opposition CHP outpolled Erdogan’s AKP in 2024 local elections for the first time in 22 years, following a narrow 52-48 loss in the 2023 presidential race.
• Esen frames Turkey’s political divide not as secular versus Islamist, but fundamentally as authoritarianism versus democracy, noting that some Islamist and nationalist parties in the opposition also reject Erdogan’s rule.

The Roots of the Syrian Civil War and Turkey’s Long Involvement

Esen traces the current Syrian collapse back through more than a decade of civil war and shifting alliances.

• He explains that Turkey, alongside the US, UK, France, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, backed the Syrian opposition from the start of the 2011 uprising, expecting Assad to fall within months.
• Esen notes the plan failed because Assad’s support base extended beyond the Alawite minority to include many Christians and Sunni Arabs, allowing the government to survive far longer than anticipated.
• He describes how the resulting power vacuum in northern Syria allowed both Islamic State and the Kurdish YPG, linked to the PKK, to seize significant territory.
• Esen explains Turkey’s 2016 deal with Russia and subsequent military operations against Kurdish forces created a fragile but durable four-year stalemate in northern Syria.
• He notes Turkey’s estimated seven to ten million Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani immigrants have created significant domestic social and economic strain, particularly in border towns like Kilis, where Syrians now make up more than half the population.

Why the HTS Offensive Succeeded So Quickly

Esen offers his analysis of the specific military and geopolitical factors behind the rebels’ rapid advance.

• He attributes much of the offensive’s success to new drone technology deployed by HTS, comparing the psychological effect on Syrian troops to the devastating drone warfare seen in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
• Esen argues Israel’s failure to fully defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon led it to conclude the only way to weaken Hezbollah was to cut its Iranian supply lines running through Syria.
• He explains that HTS, as a radical Sunni group, shares Israel’s interest in severing Iranian supply routes, since HTS regards Iran and Shia groups as a greater enemy than Israel itself.
• Esen notes the timing directly followed the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, suggesting the offensive was unlikely to be coincidental.
• He describes Turkey as providing the essential and organised supply route for the offensive, while Qatar provided funding, with US and NATO backing completing the coordination.

Erdogan’s Balancing Act Between Ideology and Economic Interest

Esen examines the tension between Erdogan’s rhetoric and Turkey’s underlying strategic calculations.

• Esen notes Erdogan has long maintained rhetorical support for the Palestinian cause while continuing significant trade with Israel, including reported unofficial continuation of trade after public pressure forced an official halt.
• He explains Erdogan’s primary motivation in Syria is economic: securing Turkish companies a central role in reconstructing Syria’s devastated cities and economy.
• Esen argues this economic interest outweighs both Palestinian solidarity and broader geopolitical considerations in shaping Turkish policy.
• He notes domestic political costs for Erdogan, with an Islamist party using accusations of hypocrisy over Israel trade to win support directly from AKP’s own base.
• Esen describes Turkey’s dependence on Russian natural gas and nuclear power investment as creating a deeply complicated relationship that coexists uneasily with Turkey’s opposition to Russia in both Ukraine and Syria.

The Fracturing of Syria and the Risk of De Facto Partition

Esen forecasts a fragmented Syria divided along ethnic and sectarian lines rather than a swift, unified transition.

• He predicts a de facto partition of Syria: a Kurdish-controlled northeast, a Sunni-ruled central zone under various opposition factions, and a possible Russian-aligned coastal enclave.
• Esen draws a direct parallel to Afghanistan, warning that once a common enemy is defeated, opposition factions frequently turn on one another, as seen among the mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal.
• He assesses that neither Russia nor Iran retains the capability to reverse Assad’s collapse or save the regime militarily.
• Esen suggests Assad may use remaining resistance in Damascus as a bargaining chip for a negotiated exit, drawing on lessons from the chaotic final days of the Afghan government.
• He highlights Russia’s naval base in Latakia as strategically vital, given the Montreux Convention restricts Russian warship movement between the Black Sea and Mediterranean, making Syria’s coast Russia’s only Mediterranean access point.

Iran’s Losses and the Wider Regional Realignment

Esen closes by assessing how the Syrian collapse fits into the broader post-October 7th regional realignment.

• He describes Iran as ‘the biggest loser’ of the past week, having lost a critical link connecting it to Hezbollah and its wider regional network.
• Esen notes growing resentment toward Iranian influence among ordinary Iraqis and Syrians, who increasingly prioritise Arab national identity over sectarian alignment with Tehran.
• He argues Russia is likely to use its remaining leverage in Syria as one element within a larger negotiation with the incoming Trump administration, potentially spanning Ukraine, Georgia and Syria simultaneously.
• Esen assesses that America’s leverage over Russia in Ukraine negotiations may increase if Moscow is forced to negotiate over its Syrian basing rights.
• He closes by noting the close, complicated relationship between Israel and Russia, suggesting any deal over Russia’s Syrian bases would likely run through Tel Aviv rather than Washington alone.

Major Takeaways

• Turkey’s political system fits the academic definition of ‘competitive authoritarianism’, comparable to Hungary and Poland, with elections that are free but not fair.
• The HTS offensive succeeded partly due to new drone warfare capabilities and partly because it served the interests of multiple external powers, including Turkey, Qatar and, in Esen’s assessment, Israel.
• Erdogan’s Syria policy is driven primarily by economic interest in reconstruction contracts, even as it creates domestic political tension around his rhetorical support for Palestine.
• Esen forecasts a likely de facto partition of Syria into Kurdish, Sunni-opposition and possibly Russian-aligned coastal zones rather than a swift unified transition.
• Iran emerges as the single biggest loser from Syria’s collapse, having lost a critical strategic link to Hezbollah and its wider regional network.
• Russia’s Syrian bases, while historically significant, are likely to become one bargaining chip among several, including Ukraine and Georgia, in a broader negotiation with the incoming Trump administration.

About Professor Berk Esen

Professor Berk Esen is an Istanbul-based political scientist specialising in the study of Turkish politics, democratic backsliding and the geopolitics of the Middle East. His research on ‘competitive authoritarianism’ in Turkey, comparing Turkey’s political trajectory to Hungary and Poland, has established him as one of the leading academic voices analysing Turkey’s democratic decline and its regional foreign policy.

A frequent commentator in English-language media on Turkish and Middle Eastern affairs, Esen’s expertise spans:

• Turkish domestic politics and the AKP’s electoral strategy
• Competitive and hybrid authoritarian regimes globally
• Turkey’s role in the Syrian civil war and its relations with Russia and NATO
• Kurdish politics and the PKK-PYD relationship across Turkey, Iraq and Syria
• Regional drone warfare and its impact on Middle East conflicts

About Kianistan Podcast

Kianistan Podcast, hosted by Tafhim Kiani, is dedicated to bringing listeners fast, informed analysis when the news cycle is moving too quickly for most outlets to keep up. When a fast-moving crisis like Syria’s sudden collapse demands both immediate context and deep regional expertise, the show seeks out guests who can speak to both the domestic politics of key regional players and the wider geopolitical chessboard at once.

This conversation with Professor Berk Esen, recorded as Syrian government forces were still retreating city by city, reflects that mission, combining rigorous academic analysis of Turkish politics with real-time geopolitical assessment of one of the most consequential regional shifts in years. Kianistan Podcast remains committed to giving audiences the depth of understanding that breaking news alone cannot provide.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is Professor Berk Esen?

Berk Esen is an Istanbul-based political scientist specialising in Turkish politics and Middle East geopolitics, known for his research applying the concept of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ to Turkey’s political system.

What is ‘competitive authoritarianism’ as applied to Turkey?

It refers to a political system, similar to Hungary and Poland, where elections take place and opposition parties can compete and occasionally win, but the ruling party maintains overwhelming structural advantages including control of state media and vast financial resources, making the playing field fundamentally unfair.

Why did the HTS offensive in Syria succeed so quickly in December 2024?

Esen attributes the rapid success to new drone warfare technology that demoralised Syrian troops, combined with coordinated backing from Turkey, Qatar and, in his assessment, tacit support from Israel, which sought to cut Iran’s supply lines to Hezbollah through Syrian territory.

What does Esen predict for Syria’s future after Assad’s fall?

He forecasts a likely de facto partition of the country into a Kurdish-controlled northeast, a Sunni-opposition-controlled central zone, and a possible Russian-aligned coastal enclave, rather than a swift, unified political transition.

Conclusion

Professor Berk Esen’s conversation with Kianistan Podcast offers a rare combination of deep expertise on Turkish domestic politics and sharp real-time analysis of the fast-moving Syrian collapse. His framing of Turkey as a competitive authoritarian state locked in an uneasy balancing act between economic self-interest, Palestinian solidarity rhetoric and a complicated relationship with Russia illuminates just how many competing pressures are shaping Ankara’s calculations.

As Syria heads toward what Esen forecasts as likely fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines, his analysis of Iran’s severe strategic losses and Russia’s uncertain path forward offers essential context for understanding a regional realignment whose consequences will likely unfold over years, not weeks. It is precisely the kind of grounded, expert perspective Kianistan Podcast listeners have come to rely on during moments of rapid geopolitical change.

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